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Abstract
This paper proves that oligopolistic price competition with both targeted advertising and
targeted prices can lead to a permanent fragmentation of the market into a local monopoly.
However, compared to mass advertising, targeting increases social welfare and turns out to
be more beneficial for consumers than for firms.
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The current proliferation of new and highly specialized communication channels (the Internet, cable
TV, specialized press, etc.) is leading ﬁrms to progressively abandon the use of indiscriminate
mass advertising to inform consumers about their new products in favor of targeted advertising,
which allows sellers to concentrate their ads on particular segments of the potential demand, thus
saving advertising costs. This change in advertising technology has important implications for
the pattern of price competition between ﬁrms. Under mass advertising, information is uniformly
spread throughout the market, which induces ﬁrms to actively compete in prices. By contrast,
targeting may allow a seller to reach uninformed consumers who are not in the target set of the
competitors, thus obtaining a captive market which the ﬁrm can try to monopolize. The key issue
then is to what extent the transition from mass to targeted advertising can lead to a fragmentation
of the market, that is to say, to the formation of local monopolies. The answer to this question will
help to explain how the proliferation of new advertising technologies can aﬀect consumers, ﬁrms
and social welfare.
The existing literature on strategic targeted advertising claims that a price competition game
with either homogeneous (Galleotti et. al., 2004) or horizontally diﬀerentiated products (Iyer et. al.,
2005) only has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and, therefore, that targeting can fragment
the market only from time to time. We address the problem by considering that products are
vertically diﬀerentiated and that targeting is closely related to the feasibility of price discrimination
through discount coupons. In this alternative framework, we show that the joint consideration
of targeted advertising and targeted prices can indeed lead to permanent market fragmentation.
However, in the price-discrimination equilibrium, the use of targeted advertising increases social
welfare, whereas the impact on consumers’ surplus (ﬁrms’ proﬁts) turns out to depend on the type
of product quality that they buy (sell).
2 The Model
Consider a market with two ﬁrms competing simultaneously in prices and using informative ad-
vertising to promote sales. Consumers are unaware of the existence of the goods1 and sellers can
inform them about their existence, price and product speciﬁcations by using either mass advertis-
ing, which reaches the whole potential market, or specialized advertising, which targets the ads on
1We assume that consumers’ search cost is high relative to the expected surplus oﬀered by the goods, in such a
way that potential buyers are passive and, in the absence of information, do not purchase any good (see, for example,
Grossman and Shapiro, 1984 or Stahl, 1994).
1a particular segment of the market. In a model of targeting, the fundamental issue is on which
segment of the market the specialized media concentrate the ads. In this regard, we follow Esteban
et. al. (2001, 2006), who note that the degree of media specialization is often positively correlated
with consumers’ valuation of the goods, in such a way that ﬁrms can frequently target their ads only
on the most eager consumers. One example of this targeting technology is the case of “specialized
magazines with nested readerships.” There are magazines containing general information on sports,
medicine, computers, family matters, etc., while there are others specialized in particular sports
(soccer, basketball, golf, etc.), medical specialities (surgery, radiology, dermatology, etc.), computer
issues (video-games, Internet, etc.) or leisure activities (ﬁtness, decoration, gardening, etc.) which
reach high valuation consumers. Accordingly, ﬁrms can target the most eager consumers by using
the specialized media. However, to reach low-valuation consumers, sellers can only use general
magazines which reach the whole potential market.2
In order to accommodate this type of targeting into a price competition model, it is necessary to
impose a particular structure on consumers’ preference ordering. Both ﬁrms can be in accordance
about who the "most eager customers" are only if all consumers agree on the preference ordering,
that is to say if, when products are oﬀered at the same price, all customers choose to purchase the
same one. Consequently, we think that a natural way to study the eﬀects of targeted advertising
on ﬁrms’ pricing strategies is in the context of vertically diﬀerentiated products, in the spirit of
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). Therefore, we will consider that each ﬁrm supplies a good with
ad i ﬀerent level of quality and that consumers are heterogeneous in their taste for quality. In this
framework, targeting means that there is a given specialized advertising media which allows ﬁrms
to concentrate their ads on a subset of consumers who value quality most.3
In accordance with these ideas, we consider a market with a unitary mass of consumers who
demand, at most, one unit of a product. A consumer’s utility is U = v + θs − p, when he buys a
2An example might help to understand this point. Consider that a ﬁrm is introducing a product, for example, a
new computer video game, and that it can classify its potential consumers into those who are regular users of video
games, with a high valuation of the good, and those who are only regular users of computers, with a lower valuation.
A careful selection of magazines specializing in video games (such as Computer Gaming World, PC Top Player, etc.),
would allow the ﬁrm to reach exclusively high-demand consumers. However, if the ﬁr mw a n t st or e a c hl o w - d e m a n d
consumers, it has to use the class of general computer magazines (such as Computer World, Home PC, etc.), which
spread the ads across the whole potential market. As a result, the targeting technology allows ﬁrms to segment the
market only by isolating the most eager customers.
3Going back to the example of computer video games, our model of targeting implies that there is one ﬁrm
producing a high-quality video game while the other sells a low-quality video game, and that each seller can advertise
its product in highly specialized video games magazines, which reach exclusively high valuation consumers, or in
general computer magazines, which also reach low valuation consumers.
2good of quality s at price p,a n d0 if he does not buy. The parameter v>0 represents consumers’
common valuation of the product. The parameter θ of taste for quality is uniformly distributed
across the population of consumers in the interval [a,b],w i t hb − a =1 .T h e t w o ﬁrms in the
market, i =1 ,2, produce two goods of a given quality si > 0,w i t h∆s = s2 − s1 > 0,a tac o s t
C(si)=csi. Firms can inform consumers by using either the mass media, which distributes the
ads to the entire population of potential buyers [a,b], or the specialized media, which reaches only
those consumers in the segment [z,b],w i t hb>z>a .T h u s ,i ft denotes the target of the campaign,
ﬁrm i can insert the ads in the mass media, ti = a, and/or in the specialized media4 ti = z>a ,
and we assume that the value of z is exogenous. We further consider that when a ﬁrm advertises
the product in a segment of the market, all consumers in that segment become informed about the
existence, price and characteristics of the good. Advertising is costly, and the cost of a campaign
depends on the size of the target market. If A0 denotes the cost of informing all consumers in [a,b],
and A1 denotes the cost of a campaign targeted on [z,b], then, given that targeting reduces the
number of consumers reached by the campaign, we consider5 that ∆A = A0 − A1 > 0.
Having speciﬁed the fundamentals of the model, we now analyze the simultaneous move game in
which both ﬁrms decide their pricing-targeted advertising strategies, (pi,t i). For future reference,
let (pm
1 ,p m
2 ) denote the unique equilibrium price strategies when both ﬁrms can use only mass





with ﬁrm 1 (the low-quality ﬁrm) and ﬁr m2s e r v i n gt h em a r k e ts e g m e n t s[a,θm] and [θm,b],
respectively (see the Appendix for details of this equilibrium). This solution, which is equal to the
full information outcome, constitutes a reasonable benchmark against which we can compute the
impact of targeting on market prices. Next, let us assume that there is a specialized advertising
media which allows ﬁrms to target the ads on a given subset of high valuation consumers, [z,b].
We ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti fz is suﬃciently high, z>θ m,b o t hﬁrms will have a low incentive to target
their campaigns, given that ﬁrm 1 could not reach any consumer in [a,θm],w h e r e a sﬁrm 2 could
reach only a fraction of [θm,b]. Therefore, it make sense to focus our analysis on the case in which
z ≤ θm. Under this condition, we ﬁrst prove that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the pricing-
targeted advertising game in which both ﬁrms use mass advertising does not exist (all the proofs
are relegated to the Appendix).
4Note that the simplifying assumption of a binary targeting choice is not restrictive. Esteban et. al. (2006) show
that this type of analysis can be extended to the case in which a ﬁrm simultaneously uses multiple advertising media
with diﬀerent target audiences.
5Esteban et. al. (2001, 2006) provide empirical evidence conﬁrming this intuition for the case of “specialized
magazines with nested readerships.” For example, for the case of computer magazines in the Dutch market, they
claim that moving an advertising campaign from less to more specialized media yields a cost saving of 44%.
3Lemma 1 If z ≤ θm, the strategy proﬁle s =[ ( p1,t 1 = a);(p2,t 2 = a)] cannot be an equilibrium.
Lemma 1 simply states that using mass advertising cannot be optimal, given that ﬁrms can
beneﬁt from the higher cost eﬃciency of targeting, and so we must look for equilibria in which some
ﬁrm targets its campaign. Taking into account that nowadays the number of specialized media is
growing very fast, it makes sense to consider that some ﬁrms may be able to implement precise
advertising campaigns. Accordingly, we concentrate our attention on the most interesting targeting
scenario, namely, the case in which the high-quality ﬁrm can approximately target its potential
customers, i.e. z −→ θm. In this set up, and given the natural asymmetry of vertically diﬀerentiated
m a r k e t s ,w en o t et h a tﬁrms have diﬀerent incentives to use mass or targeted advertising. Thus,
ﬁrm 2 has a particularly high incentive to use specialized advertising, given that this media allows
the ﬁrm to reach its clients at a lower advertising cost. By contrast, under uniform pricing, ﬁrm
1 has a clear incentive to set t1 = a, since this is the natural way in which the seller can reach its
potential market, whereas setting t1 = z would basically trigger more intense price competition.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to look for an equilibrium strategy proﬁle with (t1 = a,t2 = z).
However, Lemma 2 sates that, under these conditions, the pricing-targeted advertising game does
not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If z −→ θm, the pricing-targeted advertising game does not have a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in which (t1 = a,t2 = z).
The intuition of this Lemma is as follows. Starting from the benchmark, where ﬁrms can use
only mass advertising, when sellers can target their ads on z −→ θm,a n dg i v e ns1 =( pm
1 ,t 1 = a),
ﬁr m2 ’ sb e s tr e s p o n s ei ss2 =( pm
2 ,t 2 = z), which causes products to be diﬀerentiated along two
dimensions, quality and information, thus substantially changing the pattern of price competition
in the market. In particular, given this s2, ﬁrm 1’s best response is s1 =( pM
1 ,t 1 = a),t h a ti st o
say, to charge the monopoly price, pM
1 >p m
1 , to the segment of imperfectly informed consumers,
[a,z]. The problem with this outcome is that both products are strategic complements and so, if
t2 = z, ﬁrm 2 would respond to the monopolization of [a,z] by raising the price, p2 >p m
2 .T h i sw i l l
lead ﬁrm 1 to compete for the segment of the market [z,b] by lowering the price p1 <p M
1 which,
in turn, will induce ﬁrm 2 to also lower the price. Finally, ﬁrm 1’s best response to this latter
strategy would be, once more, to monopolize [a,z] by raising the price to pM
1 ,t h u ss t a r t i n gt h e
same price-cycle again, which implies that, under uniform pricing, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
with permanent market fragmentation does not exist.
This result is in line with the existing literature on strategic targeting, which claims that this
type of advertising can fragment the market only sporadically. Next, we show that this conclusion
4changes when ﬁrms compete with vertically diﬀerentiated products and when we take into account
that targeting is closely related to price discrimination. More precisely, the following Proposition
states that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which ﬁrm 2 advertises a price pt
2 to the
segment of the market [θm,b] whilst ﬁrm 1 uses both the mass media, t1 = a, where it announces
ah i g hp r i c e ,pt
1, and the specialized media, b t1 = θm, where it inserts discount coupons which allow
consumers in [θm,b] to purchase the low-quality good at a reduced price, b pt
1.
Proposition 1 If (i) A1 <
[b−2a+c]2∆s





and (iii) s2 >
11s1(a−c)+7s1+9v
7+2(a−c) , then the following pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists:
(a)
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(t1 = a, pt
1 = v + as1);
³







,w i t hpt
1 = pM
1 ,a n db pt
1 <p m
1 .
To understand why the game has an equilibrium, note that, when price discrimination is fea-
sible, and given t2 = θm, an informational asymmetry arises across consumers allowing ﬁrm 1 to
segment the market and charge diﬀerent prices to two potential demands: (i) a captive demand,
[a,θm], which stems from uninformed consumers that can be reachedo n l yb ym a s sa d v e r t i s i n g ,
and (ii) a competitive demand, which stems from those consumers who have imperfect information
and, therefore, who are more price sensitive, and that can be isolated by the specialized media.
Proposition 1 states that ﬁrm 1 can monopolize the captive market and, simultaneously, “invade”
the rival’s market by inserting discount coupons in the specialized media in order to capture a
fraction of fully informed consumers in [θm,b].T h ekey point is that, although the segment [a,θm]
is fully monopolized, the use of coupons yields more intense competition for consumers in [θm,b]
and so, instead of raising the price, ﬁrm 2 ﬁnds it optimal to lower it below pm
2 and to set t2 = θm in
order to beneﬁt from the higher cost eﬃciency of the specialized media. As a result, there exists a
Nash equilibrium which involves a local monopoly and, therefore, our model proves that the current
proliferation of new advertising technologies can yield a permanent fragmentation of the market.
Regarding the existence conditions of the game, it is clear that, in equilibrium, ﬁrm 1 will be
able to capture some fully informed consumers, who have a relatively high taste for quality, only if
it oﬀers the low-quality good at a substantially low price, b pt
1. Taking this low price into account, the
proﬁt obtained by ﬁrm 1 from price discrimination will be positive only if the cost of targeting is
suﬃciently low (restriction (i)). In this setting, and under uniform pricing, ﬁr m2h a st w op o s s i b l e
responses: ﬁrst, it can accommodate the more intense competition induced by the use of coupons
by advertising pt
2 in the specialized media and, secondly, it can deviate by using mass advertising to
compete for the segment of the market [a,θm], thus achieving a larger market share. Obviously, ﬁrm
52w i l lﬁnd it optimal to set t2 = θm only if the shift from mass to targeted advertising generates
suﬃciently high savings in advertising costs (restriction (ii)). Finally, ﬁrm 2 could also deviate
by using both mass and specialized advertising to price discriminate with discount coupons. If
s2 is suﬃciently high, this strategy is not feasible because the optimal price set in the coupon
(which is increasing in s2) turns out to be greater than the regular price announced in the mass
advertising campaign (restriction (iii)). Accordingly, we can expect that, for a suﬃciently high
degree of product diﬀerentiation, the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 will exist if the cost of
the specialized (mass) media is suﬃciently low (high). Thus, for example, it is straightforward to
check that for the market scenario [v = 100,s 1 =3 8 ,c=0 .75,a=0 ,A 0 =1 0 ] ,i fs2 =1 6 0 ,t h es e t
of existence restrictions holds for any A1 < 4.6. Further, the equilibrium exists for a wide set of
market scenarios, some of which are shown in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here.
This table can also be used to discuss how oligopolistic price discrimination, based on targeted
coupons, can aﬀect both consumers and ﬁrms. The existing literature on informative advertising
targeted on high valuation consumers (Esteban et. al., 2001, 2006) states that this type of ad-
vertising yields higher prices,6 thus increasing ﬁrms’ proﬁts (Πi) and lowering consumers’ surplus
(CS). By contrast, the literature on oligopolistic price discrimination with coupons targeted on low
valuation consumers (Bester and Petrakis, 1996) yields the opposite results. Given the asymmetry
of vertically diﬀerentiated markets, in our model the two ﬁrms use specialized advertising for quite
diﬀerent purposes. Firm 2 targets the advertising simply to better reach those consumers with a
higher valuation of its product. By contrast, given that ﬁrm 1 can use mass advertising to fully
monopolize its captive market, it uses the targeting to reach the segment of the market with a
more price sensitive demand and, in this sense, the targeted ads reach "low valuation" customers.
Accordingly, it is worth noting that our work brings together the two strands of the above litera-
ture by combining, on the one hand, informative advertising targeted on high valuation consumers,
(t2 = z), and, on the other, price discrimination with coupons targeted on low valuation consumers,
(b t1 = z). This explains why our model yields the following variety of results.
Clearly, the transition from mass to targeted advertising beneﬁts ﬁrm 1, given that this ﬁrm can
monopolize the captive market [a,θm] and achieve an additional proﬁt from the use of coupons.
By contrast, the impact on ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt depends on whether the savings on advertising costs
exceed the losses from the more intense price competition induced by couponing. In this respect,
6Notice that, under uniform pricing, the targeting models of Galleotti et. al. (2004) and Iyer et. al. (2005), where
the ads cannot be targeted on high valuation consumers, also yield higher prices.
6the calibration of our model suggests that, under a wide variety of market conditions, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt
tends to decrease with targeting. Indeed, this proﬁt increases only if ∆A is very high (A0 =2 0 ,A 1 =
4.6). As regards consumers, those who have imperfect information are worse oﬀ with targeting,
given that they end up paying the monopoly price. However, all consumers who are fully informed
pay a lower price and, therefore, are better oﬀ, due to either the use of coupons or the more intense
price competition in which both ﬁrms engage. Regarding these trade-oﬀs, extensive simulation
of our model yields two interesting results (see Table 1): (i) even though specialized advertising
generates a local monopoly, targeting increases aggregate consumer surplus and (ii) even though
specialized advertising generates substantial saving on advertising costs, targeting is likely to yield
lower aggregate proﬁts. Therefore, it seems that, at the aggregate level, the eﬀects associated with
price discrimination dominate the eﬀects related to the higher market power induced by targeting,
and so targeted advertising is likely to be more beneﬁcial for consumers than for ﬁrms.
Finally, under reasonable market conditions (v not very small), in equilibrium, the market is
fully covered, and so the impact of targeting on social welfare depends essentially on the advertising
costs. In this regard, the transition from mass to targeted advertising reduces the advertising
budget of ﬁrm 2 by ∆A and increases the advertising cost of ﬁrm 1 by A1. Extensive simulations
of our model yield that, in equilibrium, ∆A>A 1, which explains why the level of social welfare
(computed as CS+Π1+Π2) in Table 1 is always higher with targeting than with mass advertising.
This suggests that, even though targeting generates a local monopoly, this advertising technology
is welfare-improving.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper formulates a simple model of oligopolistic price competition, with both targeted adver-
tising and targeted prices, to prove that the transition from mass advertising to targeting can lead
to a permanent fragmentation of the market into a local monopoly. Further, we ﬁnd that, although
targeting is more eﬃcient than mass advertising, the use of specialized media tends to reduce the
proﬁts achieved by the high-quality ﬁrm. Finally, a particularly noteworthy result is that, even
though the market is fragmented, targeting increases both consumer surplus and social welfare.
These results contribute to the ongoing research on targeted advertising by providing some new
insights about how the proliferation of new advertising technologies can aﬀect market performance.
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8Appendix:
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :If t1 = t2 = a and ﬁrms compete for the fully informed marginal consumer
θ =
p2−p1
∆s ,p r o ﬁts are given by7
Π1 =( p1 − cs1)(
p2 − p1
∆s
− a) − A0, (1)
Π2 =( p2 − cs2)( b −
p2 − p1
∆s
) − A0. (2)
Diﬀerentiating these expressions with respect to p1 and p2 we obtain the reactions functions:
pm
1 (p2)=





p1 + b∆s + cs2
2
. (4)






3 ,w i t hp r o ﬁts Πm
1 =
[∆s(1−a)+cs2−cs1)]2
9∆s − A0,a n dΠm
2 =
[∆s(2+a)+cs1−cs2)]2





Then, given (t1 = a, pm


















∆s . In this case, the price that maximizes Π2(p2,z)=( p2−cs2)( b−
p2−pm
1
∆s )−A1(z) is p2 = pm
2 ,








1(z) > 0 which implies that, given
the pricing-advertising strategy of ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2’s best response is t2 = z. Therefore, t1 = t2 = a
cannot be part of an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :For the targeting strategy (t1 = a,t2 = z),i fﬁrm 1 competes for fully
informed consumers in [z,b], then the optimal prices are (pm
1 ,p m




∆s .H o w -
ever, this is not an equilibrium strategy, given that if t2 = z −→ θm and p2 = pm
2 ,t h e ni t













∆s <θ m and the demand served by







. As a result of this monopolization strategy, if t2 = z,
ﬁr m2f a c e sad e m a n d :D2 = Min[b − z,b −
p2−pM
1
∆s ]. Given that from (4) we know that
∂p2
∂p1 < 1,
the solution of Maxp2 (p2 − cs2)( b −
p2−pM
1
∆s ) − A1 yields
p2−pM
1
∆s <θ m.T h e r e f o r e ,D2 = b− z,a n d
ﬁrm 2 will respond to pM
1 by charging the maximum price that the marginal consumer, z = θm,i s
willing to pay, i.e. p0
2 = pM




∆s = θm.G i v e n(t2 = z,p0
2), ﬁrm 1 can
either monopolize [a,z], which yields a beneﬁt ΠM
1 =( pM
1 − cs1) DM
1 − A0,o rc o m p e t ef o r[z,b],
which implies to maximize Π0
1 =( p1 − cs1)(
p0
2−p1
∆s − a) − A0. The solution of this problem yields
















2(z − a) − 4DM
1
¤
< 0. Taking into consideration
that DM
1 ≤ z − a,w eh a v et h a t2(z − a) − 4DM
1 ≥− 2(z − a),a n ds o
0 > (pM
1 − cs1)2 +( z − a)2∆s2 +( pM
1 − cs1)∆s
£





1 − cs1)2 +( z − a)2∆s2 − 2(pM
1 − cs1)∆s(z − a)=
£
(pM
1 − cs1) − ∆s(z − a)
¤2
,
which constitutes a contradiction. This shows that ﬁrm 1’s best response to (t2 = z,p0
2) is to
compete for [z,b]. Finally, if both ﬁrms compete for the fully informed consumers in [z,b],t h e
unique Nash equilibrium of the pricing game is (pm
1 ,p m
2 ) which, as we have already shown, cannot
be part of an equilibrium. This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : To prove that these strategy proﬁles indeed constitute an equilibrium
and to prove existence, we need to verify that neither ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from the
strategies prescribed and that expected proﬁts are strictly positive.
• We ﬁrst analyze ﬁrm 1’s optimal strategy. Given
¡
t2 = θm,p t
2
¢
, ﬁrm 1 can monopolize [a,z]
according to the demand DM
1 = Min[θm −
p1−v
s1 ,θm − a] and, at the same time, this ﬁrm can
compete for those consumers in [z,b] by advertising a low price, b pt
1, in the specialized media, i.e.
b t1 = θ
m
, in order to capture an additional demand b D1 = Min[
pt
2−b p1
∆s − θm,b− θm].T o f o c u st h e
analysis on the most interesting case, we assume that DM
1 = θm − a = b−2a+c
3 , which implies
v ≥
(b−5a+4c)s1
3 , and that b D1 =
pt
2−b p1
∆s − θm. Under these conditions, pt
1 = v + as1 and b p1 is deter-










Given this result, it is straightforward to see that b pt
1 <p m
1 <p t
1. Further, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are
Πt
1 =[ v +( a − c)s1](b−2a+c
3 ) − A0 +
[b−2a+c]2∆s
81 − A1, and the equilibrium can exist only if price
discrimination is proﬁtable, i.e.
[b−2a+c]2∆s
81 − A1 > 0.
• Next, we analyze ﬁrm 2’s optimal strategy. Given [
¡
t1 = a, pt










if ﬁrm 2 sets t2 = θ
m
,t h e npt














9 ,a n dΠt
2 =
[5b−a−4c]2∆s
81 − A1. Starting from this
solution, ﬁrm 2 has two possible deviations:























3 ]. Under this
strategy, p2 and b p2 are determined by
Maxp2,b p2 Π2 =( b p2 − cs2)
µ
b −













10which yields b p2 =
(5b−a)∆s+4cs1+5cs2
9 = pt
2,a n dp2 =
(a+b)∆s+3as1+4cs2−cs1+3v
6 . This type of deviation
will be possible only if b p2 < p2. Therefore, if b p2 > p2 (or, more generally, if proﬁts from price
discrimination are negative, i.e.
[(a+b−2c)s2+3v−(b−2a+c)s1]2
36∆s − A0 < 0), ﬁrm 2 will not deviate.
(ii) Firm 2 can also advertise a uniform price p2 in t2 = a. In this case, it faces two demands:










with inverse demand p2 = Max[θ
m











3 ], with inverse demand p2 =
Max[
2(5b−a)∆s+8cs1+cs2
9 − ∆sD 22,
(4b+a+3c)∆s+8cs1+cs2
9 ].









∆s + v + as1,( b )t h a tpm
1 <v+ as1 implies θm∆s + v + as1 >
(4b+a+3c)∆s+8cs1+cs2
9 and, ﬁnally, (c) that Dm
1 > 0 implies θ
m
∆s+v +as1 >v+as2. Accordingly,
for the case in which
(4b+a+3c)∆s+8cs1+cs2
9 >v+ as2 , ﬁrm 2 faces an aggregate demand:
D2 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩






















9 >p 2 >v+ as2
1 if p2 <v+ as2
whereas if
(4b+a+3c)∆s+8cs1+cs2
9 <v+ as2 , the demand is
e D2 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩



















∆s if v + as2 >p 2 >
(4b+a+3c)∆s+8cs1+cs2
9





9 ≶ v + as2, the deviation related to the second section of these
demands cannot be proﬁtable, given that the solution is dominated by t2 = θm. Further, the
optimal price corresponding to the third section is given by the solution of:
Maxpd
2 Π2 =( p2 − cs2)
µ
13b + a +4 c
9
+













648∆s − A0. Thus,
the strategy
¡
t2 = a, pd
2
¢






Therefore, the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists only if the following three conditions
hold: (i)
[b−2a+c]2∆s
81 − A1 > 0,( i i )Πd
2 < Πt
2,a n d( i i i )b p2 > p2 , and the existence conditions
11formulated in the Proposition are directly obtained from these inequalities. We have computed the
model for diﬀerent market scenarios and have found that for the third section of D2 and e D2 (and
only for this section) the parameter space which satisﬁes all these restrictions is not empty (see
Table 1) and, therefore, the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists.










0 38 160 10 4.6 99.6;170.8 31.5;11.1 100 52.2 147.1 31.7;1.4 29.9 41.9
0 20 160 10 3.2 96.6;178.3 37,6;14.3 100 42.2 151.1 41.6;3.7 25.4 37.5
0 74 147 10 2.4 98.0;140.6 14.8;2.6 100 69.6 126.4 16.3;1.2 45.2 51.4
0 34 156 20 4.6 96.6;167.8 21.5;1.1 100 49.2 144.1 23.4;1.4 30.9 41.1
0.2 84 168 10 2.2 106.4;166.6 12.4;9.6 116.8 77.4 152.1 18.0;5.9 62.2 82.4
Table 1. Equilibria (v =1 0 0 ,c=0 .75).
12